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Abstract
This study examines psychological correlates of Jewish-Israeli support for post-conflict political
reconciliation with Jordan. An analysis of data from a public opinion survey conducted with a
representative sample of Israeli-Jews (n=1000) indicated that appraisal of outgroup collective threat, as
well as hatred and (lack of) sympathy towards Jordanians, predicted Jewish-Israeli decreased support for
peaceful reconciliation with Jordan. Our findings point to the crucial role of threat perceptions in hindering
post-conflict reconciliation and to the importance of sympathy towards the other side in increasing
support for such reconciliation.
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Psychological Correlates of Public Support
PSYCHOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
RECONCILIATION: THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CASE

Ifat Maoz, Jacob Shamir, Gadi Wolfsfeld and Shira Dvir
Abstract
This study examines psychological correlates of Jewish-Israeli support for post-conflict
political reconciliation with Jordan. An analysis of data from a public opinion survey
conducted with a representative sample of Israeli-Jews (n=1000) indicated that appraisal
of outgroup collective threat, as well as hatred and (lack of) sympathy towards Jordanians,
predicted Jewish-Israeli decreased support for peaceful reconciliation with Jordan. Our
findings point to the crucial role of threat perceptions in hindering post-conflict
reconciliation and to the importance of sympathy towards the other side in increasing
support for such reconciliation.

Introduction
Recent work acknowledges the importance of public support for the ability of leaders
to implement steps of post-conflict reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2000). However, scarce
attention is paid to systematic empirical investigation of the psychological bases of such
support. This study redresses this omission by examining psychological factors that predict
Jewish-Israeli public support for reconciliation with Jordan following the signing of a peace
treaty between the two countries. Post-conflict situations are often characterized by the
persistence of deeply-set attitudes of animosity towards the other side that can block
support for peaceful reconciliation. In this study we focus on three indicators of such
animosity. One is the extent to which citizens perceive their country/entity as being
threatened by the other side; this will be referred to herein as appraisal of outgroup
collective threat. The two other components relate to peoples’ intergroup emotions,
including the extent of hatred and of sympathy citizens feel towards the other side. In this
study, based on analysis of data collected in a survey of Jewish-Israeli public opinion
(n=1000), we examine whether attitudes of animosity still persist in the post-conflict
situation between Israelis and Jordanians and the extent to which these attitudes function as
psychological barriers to public support for peaceful reconciliation between the two
countries.

Scientific Background
Resolving protracted conflicts is a complex, time-consuming challenge. Even when
mutual agreements are signed, the resulting post-conflict situations still require a long and
gradual reconciliation process in which the parties build cooperative relations and a stable
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peace between them (Bar-On, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2001; Kelman, 1999; Lederach, 1998). The
examples of peace making in Northern Ireland (Arthur, 1999) and the South African Truth
and reconciliation process (Hamber, 1998) demonstrate that signing official agreements
between leaders is not enough. These have to be accompanied by dynamics of social,
psychological and structural change at the both at the level of policy-makers and the public
on both sides so that stable peace can be reached (Bar-On, 1997; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004).
Unless the general public in each country support reconciliation, peace remains tentative
and unstable (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004).
Lederach (1998) has noted that the reconciliation process requires implementation of
formal policies that forge relations between former rivals, create cooperative links and
stabilize peaceful relationships. These steps towards political reconciliation include
developing joint institutions and organizations, free and open trade, joint economic
ventures, and free and open tourism, as well as exchanging cultural products and
information in various areas. However, such policies often seem difficult to achieve in the
aftermath of protracted ethnic conflict. The difficulties are not only related to the lack of
agreement or cooperation between policymakers, but are also to the lack of public support
on each side for embarking on a route of cooperation with the other side.
Threat appraisal has been identified as an important factor determining policy
preferences in situations of conflict or increased intergroup tension and violence. Societies
involved in intractable conflicts are dominated by an orientation towards threat (Bar-Tal,
2001). Whilst an orientation of threat may be functional for coping with the stressful,
highly uncertain and demanding situation of warfare, when it is maintained in post-conflict
situations, it serves as a barrier to progress in the peace process via reconciliation and
cooperation with the other side (Kelman, 1999).
As in similar intractable conflicts to the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict, orientations of
outgroup threat are a dominant force in maintaining and escalating the conflict. In the
Israeli-Palestinian context, Jewish-Israeli outgroup threat perception was found to be
associated with less conciliatory and less compromising positions towards Palestinians
(Bar-Tal, 2001). Nevertheless, intergroup emotions of hatred and sympathy have also been
found to contribute (to a smaller but still independent degree) to the willingness of citizens
to make compromises (Maoz and McCauley, 2005).
There are other studies that also emphasize the importance of dealing with emotions
in attempts at conflict resolution. This literature describes how negative and widely shared
emotions towards the other side that are usually dominant in societies involved in conflict
(such as anger, fear and hatred) can also remain dominant in post-conflict situations and
thus become a barrier to reconciliation and cooperation (Bar-On, 1997, 2008; Bar-Tal,
2001, 2007; Staub, 1990). On the other hand, equally crucial is the development of positive
emotions in post-conflict situations, such as hope (Bar-Tal, 2001), caring, sensitivity and
empathy to the members of the other group (Bar-On, 2008; Kelman, 1999). Positive
emotional orientations towards the other side are described as necessary for achieving and
maintaining reconciliation and cooperation between former enemies (Kelman, 1999).
In this study we intend to expand this line of research and look at how well these
psychological variables empirically explain public attitudes towards reconciliation during
the more advanced stages of a peace process. Understanding the psychological
underpinnings of support for reconciliation may be even more important after a formal
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agreement has been signed (Kelman, 1999). Once some of the more objective reasons for
hostility have been removed, leaders need to place a greater emphasis on attitudinal
barriers.

Jordan and Israel
The signing of the Israel-Jordan peace accord in 1994 represented a significant
breakthrough in the ongoing Middle East conflict. Israelis have traditionally harbored
considerably less hostility towards Jordan than towards the Palestinians. King Hussein was
considered a relatively moderate Arab leader by most Israelis and the two countries often
carried out clandestine forms of cooperation long before they were engaged in a formal
peace process. Jordan’s willingness to come to a formal agreement with Israel was directly
related to the early stages of the Oslo peace process when it seemed that peace might also
be achieved with the Palestinians.
There was a great deal of optimism in the air when the treaty itself was signed at a
ceremony attended by Prime Minister Rabin, King Hussein, and President Clinton. It is
interesting that the wording of the treaty refers specifically to the need to address the
subjective sources of hostility among the two publics: “Bearing in mind the importance of
maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for
fundamental human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting
human dignity”; “Desiring to develop friendly relations and co-operation between them in
accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in time
of peace” (Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, October 26, 1994).
Unfortunately, the Oslo peace process ended in failure and this had a major impact on
the relations between the two countries (Scham and Lucas, 1998; Wolfsfeld, 2002). After
the eruption of the second Intifada, Jordan recalled its ambassador for several years and
relations remain strained. Nevertheless, the leaders of both countries have since continued
to attempt to maintain and even advance the peace and peace building practices between the
sides.

Dynamics of Asymmetric Threat
Several studies have examined Jordanian attitudes towards Israel and towards
normalization and reconciliation with it and have found, in most cases, that these attitudes
are quite negative (Kornbluth, 2002; Scham and Lucas, 1998). It is important to point out,
however, that the level of hostility in Israel towards Jordan was not perceived to be as acute
as the degree of animosity felt in Jordan towards Israel. The Israeli elites and general
publics have, some argue, been generally more supportive of “normalizing” relations
between the two countries than their Jordanian counterparts (Scham and Lucas, 1998;
Wolfsfeld, Alimi and Kaliani, 2008). A major reason for this difference is the asymmetrical
strategic balance between the two countries: Jordan does not represent a serious security
threat to Israel, but many (if not most) Jordanians consider Israel a serious threat to the
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region. Once the peace treaty was signed and the Israeli need for recognition and security
were addressed, Jordan was not considered a threat by most Israelis. This is not the case for
Jordan, which has experienced severe economic and security issues since the signing of the
peace treaty in 1994, especially following the collapse of the Oslo process and the
reemergence of Israeli-Palestinian violence in September 2000 (Wolfsfeld et al., 2008).
Little research attention has been dedicated, however, to studying, in this context of
asymmetrical strategic relations, the attitudes of Israeli-Jews towards Jordan. The aim of
our study is to fill this gap and to investigate Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards Jordanians
and examine the effect of these attitudes on Jewish-Israeli support for post-conflict
reconciliation with Jordan.

Intergroup Attitudes: Threat Appraisal and Emotions
The research will focus on two types of intergroup attitudes that are expected to
predict a willingness for peaceful reconciliation, i.e. appraisal of outgroup collective threat
and intergroup emotions. This distinction is important because the appraisal of outgroup
collective threat can be seen, to some extent, as a more cognitive or analytical type of
construct. It is a more “macro” construct that mostly refers to peoples’ assessments of how
much their country/entity is under threat from the outgroup, both in terms of the outgroup’s
perceived destructive intentions towards one’s own group and in terms of the outgroup’s
perceived ability to cause serious damage. Intergroup emotions, on the other hand, focus
more at the level of how people feel towards the outgroup, including both negative
emotions (such as hate and anger) and positive ones (such as sympathy).
We are not suggesting, of course, that it is possible to completely separate an
individual’s appraisal of collective outgroup threat from his/her personal feelings. Indeed,
the level of hatred one feels towards the outgroup is very likely to be related to one’s
appraisal of collective threat from the outgroup. It is nevertheless worthwhile to make this
distinction because negative emotions towards a former enemy are likely to continue long
after any serious outgroup threat has been removed. In addition, the path for reducing a
sense of collective threat from the outgroup may run in a very different direction from the
path towards reducing negative emotions (or increasing positive emotions) towards the
other side.
We adopt in this research a relatively broad approach to the notion of appraisal of
outgroup collective threat that relates specifically to Jordanian threat but also to the more
general Israeli perception of threat from all Arab countries and entities. Our assumption
was that, in addition to the appraisal of specific collective threat from Jordan, the general
appraisal of Arab collective threat to Israel was likely to affect respondents’ overall
willingness to support reconciliation with Jordan. Hence, we used in this study two
measures of Jewish-Israeli appraisal of outgroup collective threat: (1) appraisal of
Jordanian Collective Threat – relating to specific threat from Jordan, and (2) appraisal of
Arab Collective Threat (relating to the more general perception of Arab countries and
entities posing a threat to Israel and including items such as: “I am concerned that in the
coming years, Arab terror against Israel will only further increase”).
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This study also focuses on two categories of intergroup emotions: hatred and
sympathy. Feeling of hatred towards former enemies is probably the easiest emotion to
understand in a conflict context, not least because it is so basic and personal. The notion of
sympathy, on the other hand, is somewhat more complex, for it refers to one’s ability to
understand the other side while being positively oriented towards it. This variable might be
especially important to examine when looking at an asymmetrical set of relations such as
those that exist between Israel and Jordan. In this context of post-conflict relations, it is
important to determine the extent to which Israeli-Jews feel sympathy towards Jordanians.

Jewish-Israeli Post-Conflict Animosity toward Jordan
Appraisal of outgroup collective threat, hatred towards the outgroup and sympathy
toward it all relate to the level of animosity people hold towards the other side. Appraisal of
high collective threat from the outgroup, together with high hatred and low sympathy
towards the outgroup, indicate a high level of animosity towards this outgroup. Appraisal of
low collective threat from the outgroup, together with low hatred and high sympathy
towards this outgroup, indicate a low level of animosity towards the outgroup. Between
these two extremes there are several combinations that indicate intermediate animosity.
While high animosity towards the outgroup clearly exists in conflict situations and has been
shown to predict (decreased) readiness for conflict resolution, the extent and effect of
animosity in post-conflict situations are less clear. Post-conflict situations often signify a
change on the political and formal level, but not necessarily a transformation in the deeper
societal–psychological level of deeply-set negative beliefs and emotions towards the other
side (Kelman, 1999). The other side tends to still be seen as threatening to some extent, and
is hated and not sympathized with, even after peace agreements have been reached. This
may constitute a major barrier to people’s readiness for reconciliation.
Given the history of the conflict between Israel and the Arab world and the past
rivalry with Jordan we assumed that Israeli-Jews would still hold, to some extent, attitudes
of animosity towards Jordan and expected that these attitudes would influence the readiness
of Israeli-Jews for peaceful reconciliation with Jordan.

Predicting Support for Peaceful Reconciliation
Support for peaceful reconciliation requires a deep and significant actual
psychological and societal change that includes not only normalization in different domains
(such as economics, security, etc.), but also a deeper transformation of the former relations
of conflict, hatred and distrust to becoming relations of cooperation and trust (Lederach,
1998). Support for such change may be strongly hindered by perceptions and feelings of
animosity towards the other side that often still powerfully persist even after the phase of
acute conflict has formally ended (Bar-Tal, 2001). Thus, it can be expected that the three
components of animosity will each significantly contribute to explaining decreased JewishIsraeli support for peaceful reconciliation in the post-conflict situation with Jordan.
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Overview of Study
The aim of our study was to explore psychological correlates of public support for
reconciliation focusing on Jewish-Israeli public opinion regarding Israeli-Jordanian
relations. Thus the criterion measures for our study assessed Jewish-Israeli support for a
number of specific policies of Israeli-Jordanian reconciliation. These included items about
open borders between Israel and Jordan, the creation of joint economic institutions, and
anti-incitement policies. As predictors of support for political reconciliation we included
three measures of the extent of Jewish-Israeli attitudes of animosity towards Jordan: a
measure of appraisal of Arab collective threat, a measure of appraisal of Jordanian
collective threat, and measures of Jewish-Israeli hatred and sympathy towards Jordanians.
We also included demographic measures.

Method
Telephone interviews (n = 1000) were conducted by the Machshov Research Institute
with a representative sample of adult Israeli-Jews in May 2004. The survey included one
set of items measuring the respondents’ attitudes toward various reconciliation policies in
Israeli-Jordanian relations and another set of items that assessed the respondents’ feelings
toward and beliefs about Jordanians and about Arabs. In addition, demographic information
was obtained. The questionnaire was administered in Hebrew. The items analyzed in this
study are described in more detail below.

Support for Reconciliation
Support for political reconciliation with Jordan was measured by a “Support for
Reconciliation Scale”. This scale was adapted to the Israeli-Jordanian context from a
similar scale constructed by Shamir and Shikaki (2002) in the context of Israeli-Palestinian
relations. Items in this scale describe a range of steps, often mentioned in reconciliation
literature as prerequisites for successful reconciliation following protracted conflicts
(Lederach, 1998). The steps include normalization measures such as open borders,
economic cooperation, and political cooperation, and transformative steps intended to
change the national ethos, such as fundamental modifications in the school curriculum
(Shamir and Shikaki, 2002). The Reconciliation Scale used in our study concentrates on the
policy level and thus includes an adaptation of the four items that measure attitudes towards
formal policies of reconciliation from the Shamir and Shikaki (2002) scale. Specifically, the
scale used in our study included the five following reconciliation measures items: “Open
Borders between Israel and Jordan so there will be a free passage of people and
merchandise”, “Create joint economic institutions and joint economic ventures”, “Create
joint political institutions”, “Introduce into the school curriculum the notion of giving up
the aspirations to appropriate parts of the ‘homeland’ that are under Palestinian control”,
and “Take legal measures against those expressing incitement towards Jordan”.
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Respondents were asked to rate support of each item on a 4-point bipolar scale ranging
from “strongly object” (1) to “strongly support” (4).

Psychological Predictors: Intergroup Attitudes of Animosity
Our indicators of the level of animosity towards Jordan included two measures of
appraisal of out group collective threat (“Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat Scale” and
“Appraisal of Jordanian Collective Threat Scale) and two measures of emotions towards
Jordanians (“Hatred towards Jordanians Scale” and “Sympathy towards Jordanians Scale”)
that were derived from Maoz and McCauley (2005), and adapted to the Jordanian postconflict context. Each of these measures was compromised of several items that were rated
on a 5-point bi-polar scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5).
However, different labels appeared in the second item in the Appraisal of Jordanian Threat
Scale (see below). Responses to these items were averaged for each respondent to form the
scales, where higher scores mean higher agreement with the designated intergroup attitude.
Below we describe the different measures in more detail.

Appraisal of Outgroup Collective Threat
Appraisal of outgroup collective threat appraisal was assessed by two measures: (1)
the “Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat Scale” that included the items: “I am concerned
that in the coming years, Arab terror against Israel will only further increase” “Arabs
understand only the language of power” “Peace is important to Arabs as it is to Jews”
(reversed); “and “Arabs hate Jews”. (2) The “Appraisal of Jordanian Collective Threat
Scale” that included the items: “If a war will break out between Israel and the Arab states,
Jordan will also join the war”; “To which direction, in your opinion, will Israeli-Jordanian
relations proceed in the coming years?” (1= get much better, 2= get better, 3= stay as they
are, 4= get worse, 5= get much worse).

Emotions towards Jordanians
Emotions towards Jordanians were assessed by two scales. The “Hatred Scale” (1)
included the items: “I feel hate towards Jordanians” and “I feel anger toward Jordanians”.
The “Sympathy Scale” (2) included the items: “I feel liking toward Jordanians”, and “I feel
understanding toward Jordanians”. Table 2 (at end of article) presents the Cronbach alphas,
means and standard deviations of each of the above scales as well as their intercorrelations.

Demographic Questions
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In addition, respondents were also presented with demographic questions. These
included questions about gender and age of the respondent, degree of religiosity, number of
years of education and economic status (level of family monthly expenditures).

Results
Our results section includes three parts. First, we present the descriptive data
regarding Jewish-Israeli support for reconciliation with Jordan. Second, we describe our
findings regarding the extent of Jewish-Israeli post-conflict attitudes of animosity towards
Jordan. Finally, we present the regression model predicting Jewish-Israeli support for
peaceful reconciliation with Jordan.

Support for the Different Reconciliation Policies
Means and standard deviations of support for the reconciliation items appear in Table
1 (at end of article). The item that Israeli-Jews view as the most acceptable is “Joint
Economic Institutions” (M = 2.98 and percentage of support: 77.4 %). The least acceptable
items are “Joint Political Institutions” and “Curriculum Change” (M’s = 2.54 and 2.33
respectively, percentages of support: 54.4% and 44% respectively). In between these two
poles we find the “Open Borders” and “Legal Measures against Incitement” items (M’s:
2.65 and 2.68 respectively, percentage of support: 61% and 60% respectively). It is
interesting though not surprising to see that the two items that meet the highest resistance
are the ones that require the most meaningful change. Joint political institutions require
political cooperation that is probably considered as involving a more significant structural
change than economic cooperation. Curriculum change requires a deep transformation of
attitudes and aspirations that are a focal part of the Jewish-Israeli national ethos (Bar-Tal,
2000), regarding the right of Jews to the “Greater land of Israel” (Eretz Israel Hashlema).

The Support for Reconciliation Scale
A scale was created of these five items (M = 2.64; SD = .68, Alpha Cronbach = .78).
The inter-correlations of these items ranged from .25 to .57 the median inter-item
correlation being .43. Responses to these items were averaged for each respondent to form
the Support for Reconciliation Scale, in which higher scores mean higher support for
reconciliation (see Table 1, end of article).

Post-conflict Attitudes of Animosity
Means and standard deviations of ratings of animosity attitudes appear in Table 2.
These data indicate that in the post-conflict situation Israeli-Jews hold mostly low attitudes
of animosity towards Jordanians and thus appraise Jordanian collective threat as low (M =
2.65) and express very low hatred towards Jordanians (M = 1.67). However, Israeli-Jews
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 16, Number 1
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also indicated low sympathy towards Jordanians (M = 2.38). Jewish-Israeli general
appraisal of “Arab threat” was found to be higher than their appraisal of Jordanian threat,
but was still quite low (M = 3.59). How do these Jewish-Israeli attitudes of low appraisal of
outgroup collective threat, low hatred but also low sympathy towards Jordanians influence
support for political reconciliation with Jordan? The next section presents our findings
regarding this question (see Table 2, end of article).

Predicting Support for Reconciliation
The regression model using the psychological measures of animosity attitudes to
predict the Support for Reconciliation Scale produced a statistically significant R2 = .27, F
(4, 995) = 92.9, p < .001. Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat was the strongest predictor of
Support for Reconciliation (β = -.30, p = .001). Thus, respondents with lower scores on this
measure, showed a significantly increased support for reconciliation, R2= .18, F (1, 998) =
218.9, p < .001. The measures of feelings towards Jordanians each made an independent,
added, lower but significant contribution to predicting support for reconciliation. Thus,
respondents with lower scores on the Hatred Scale (β = -.19, p < .001), and higher scores on
the Sympathy Scale (β = .18, p < .001) showed increased support for reconciliation with a
significant R2 change for the addition of the Hatred scale predictor over appraisal of Arab
Collective Threat, R2 change = .04, F (1,997)= 52.9, p < .001, and a significant R2 change
for the addition of the Sympathy Scale over the Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat Scale
and the Hatred Scale, R2 change = .04, F (1, 996) = 52.7, p < .001. The weakest (but still
significant) predictor was Appraisal of Jordanian Collective Threat. Respondents with
lower scores on this measure, (β = -.11, p < .001) showed increased support for political
reconciliation with a significant R2 change for its addition over the three other measures, R2
change = .01, F (1,995) = 15.9, p < .001.
Thus, in line with our hypothesis the results indicate that attitudes of animosity
towards the Jordanians: Appraisal of outgroup collective threat, hatred and (low) sympathy
towards Jordanians significantly predict decreased Jewish-Israeli support for peaceful
reconciliation with Jordan, with each of these measures providing an independent
significant contribution to the prediction. Interestingly, the appraisal of specific threat from
Jordan itself produced the lowest contribution to the prediction. Possible explanations for
this finding will be presented in the discussion section.

Demographic Measures and Support for Political Reconciliation
The addition of demographic variables to our prediction model indicated that most of
these measures (i.e. religiosity, ethnicity, gender and level of education), did not have any
significant contribution to our prediction of support for peaceful reconciliation. The only
significant demographic predictors found were age (β = .09, p = .001) and level of expenses
(β = .06, p = .03) with higher figure on each associated with higher support for
reconciliation.
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Discussion
Recent research and theorizing in the domain of conflict and conflict resolution
emphasizes that formal peace agreements between societies in protracted conflict are not
enough for establishing stable and lasting peace (Lederach, 1998).
Formal conflict resolution sometimes involves only the leaders who negotiated the
agreement or narrow strata around them. In these cases, the majority of society members
may not accept the negotiated compromises, or even if they do, may still hold world views
that have fueled the conflict. As a result, formal resolutions of conflicts may be unstable.
They may collapse as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or turn into cold peace
as in the case of Israeli-Jordanian relations. In these cases past conflictive relations have not
turned into peaceful relations of reconciliation and cooperation that involve, and are
supported by, wide sectors of publics on both sides (Bar-Tal, 2000).
Though public support is recognized as crucial in reaching peaceful reconciliation,
very few studies have tried to directly and systematically examine factors that influence
such support. One such study done by Shamir and Shikaki (2002) focused on the role of
expectations for lasting peace and democracy in Israeli and Palestinian public opinion in
support of reconciliation and compromise. Another study by Maoz and McCauley (2005)
examined psychological bases of Jewish-Israeli public opinion support for compromise
with Palestinians. Here, we expand upon these studies by examining psychological
predictors of post-conflict support for reconciliation. Specifically, we attempt to learn more
about the extent to which intergroup attitudes of animosity (such as appraisal of outgroup
collective threat as well as hatred and [low] sympathy towards the outgroup) predict
decreased Jewish-Israeli support toward reconciliation and cooperation policies in IsraeliJordanian post-conflict relations. But before discussing our prediction model and its
findings, we will discuss two other essential questions that this study dealt with. One is the
extent of Jewish-Israeli post-conflict public support for political reconciliation with Jordan
and the other is the extent to which Jewish-Israeli attitudes of animosity towards Jordan
still persist, even after the signing of the peace treaty between the two countries.

Jewish-Israeli Support for Reconciliation with Jordan
Our findings indicate that the majority of the Jewish-Israeli public support the
implementation of reconciliation policy measures with Jordan (around 60% support for
most of the measures examined). This is consistent with the results of public opinion
surveys conducted on the Jewish-Israeli population directly after the signing of the peace
accords on November and December 1994 (Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 1994).
These surveys also found high support for Israeli-Jordanian peace. Together these results
may indicate that Israeli public attitudes towards peace with Jordan are stable and relatively
positive. This contrasts with Jordanian attitudes towards peace and normalization with
Israel, which some have found to be consistently more negative since the signing of the
peace treaty (Kornbluth, 2002; Scham and Lucas, 1998).

Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 16, Number 1

- 35 -

Psychological Correlates of Public Support

Israeli Post-conflict Attitudes towards Jordan
Deeply-set hostile perceptions and emotions towards the other side have been
described as persisting in post-conflict situations and as hindering the attainment of full and
stable peace (Bar-On, 1997, 2008). Our study empirically demonstrates the sustenance of
such attitudes among the Israeli-Jewish population in the post-conflict relations with
Jordan. Though the specific appraisal of collective threat from Jordan was found as low,
another important component of appraisal of outgroup collective threat – the appraisal of
the more general Arab collective threat – remained higher (notably the change in the
relations with Jordan did not include a change in the broader context of the Israeli-Arab
conflict). As could be expected in the current phase of formal peace between the two
countries, Jewish-Israeli hatred towards Jordanians was found to be very low. However,
Israeli-Jordanian peace might be described as an extremely “cold” (almost frozen) peace, as
the extent of Israeli sympathy towards Jordanians was found to be low despite the lack of
perceived threat. Together, these findings paint a picture of slightly negative-leaning Israeli
indifference towards Jordanians. Thus, Israeli Jews do not perceive Jordanians as highly
threatening, nor are do they feel high hatred towards Jordanians, but neither do they feel
much sympathy towards them.
This makeup of attitudes can be understood as characterizing the asymmetrical postconflict relations of the stronger Israel with its past enemy Jordan, which holds a very low
strategic threat potential. The low perceived specific threat from Jordan itself to Israel gives
little reason to hate or feel anger towards Jordanians. However, as Jordanians are former
enemies and also part of the Arab world (and thus also part of the still active Israeli-Arab
conflict) positive attitudes towards them remain underdeveloped and generally weak.
How do these Jewish-Israeli attitudes of appraisal of low collective threat and low
hatred but also low sympathy towards Jordan influence Jewish-Israeli willingness for
transforming the relations between the two countries towards policies of normalization and
reconciliation? Our findings in regard to this issue are discussed in the next section.

Appraisal of Outgroup Collective Threat, Hatred and Sympathy as Predictors of Support
for Reconciliation
In line with our expectations, we found that attitudes of animosity towards Jordan –
appraisal of outgroup collective, hatred and (low) sympathy – significantly predict
decreased readiness for peaceful reconciliation with Jordan, with each measure having an
independent contribution to this prediction. Appraisal of outgroup (Arab) collective threat
was the strongest single predictor of for the extent of support for reconciliation, with the
hatred and sympathy scales each adding a smaller significant contribution. Interestingly,
our findings indicate that appraisal of Jordanian collective threat made the smallest (but still
significant) contribution to the prediction of Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards reconciliation
with Jordan. Demographic variables of age and level of expenses added a small
contribution to this prediction.
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Taken together, our findings emphasize the importance of psychological attitudes,
and specifically the role of cognitive threat appraisal together with intergroup emotion
variables, as major factors in explaining support for reconciliation. Importantly, our study
demonstrates that feelings such as sympathy towards the other side have a significant role
in predicting increased support for peaceful reconciliation in situations of post-conflict.
Nevertheless, although feelings towards Jordanians do contribute to predicting support for
reconciliation with Jordan, appraisal of outgroup collective threat (and in our case appraisal
of Arab collective threat) was still found to be the strongest single predictor of the extent of
such support.

Threat Appraisal and Support for Reconciliation
Post-conflict situations have been described as characterized by “a carry over” of
perceptions of threat that were relevant during the conflict but nevertheless continue to
have a decisive impact on public attitudes after peace agreements have been signed (BarTal, 2000; Bar-On, 1997, 2008). Our study empirically demonstrates this “carry over”
effect in which appraisal of collective threat from the outgroup – and more specifically,
appraisal of Arab collective threat – continues to be a dominant factor in the post-conflict
situation of Israeli-Jordanian relations, and importantly determines public support for
peaceful reconciliation with Jordan.
Israeli-Jewish threat orientation towards Arabs has persisted for generations and plays
a major role in policy preferences in conflict and peace processes. Teichman and Bar-Tal
(2005) conducted an extensive analysis of Arabs’ representation in Israeli political, social,
educational, cultural and media channels through 100 years of conflict. These authors found
that portrayals of Arabs as threatening have became part of the Jewish-Israeli ethos of
conflict and this leads to a continued threat orientation of the Israeli public. Wolfsfeld
(2002, 2004) demonstrates, via the most extensive and systematic studies done on the
Israeli news media in conflict and peace, how these media provide an ethnocentric
presentation of the Israeli–Arab conflict in which Arab and Palestinian destructive
intentions and threat towards Israel are highly emphasized.
Thus, it may be in the context of the asymmetric post-conflict relations between Israel
and Jordan that, as Jordan is not perceived by Israelis as specifically or realistically
threatening (Appraisal of Jordanian Collective Threat M = 2.65), Jordanian threat makes
only a small contribution to predicting support for reconciliation with Jordan. However,
Israeli-Jews perceive a much higher threat from Arabs (Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat
M = 3.59). This appraisal of Arab collective threat is significantly associated with
respondents’ lower support for peaceful reconciliation with Jordan (see also Wolfsfeld et
al., 2002 for similar observations about Israeli perception of low Jordanian threat in
contrast to perception of higher threat from other Arab entities). Our findings may indicate
that, despite the post-conflict situation, Jordan is still to an extent perceived by the Israeli
public to be part of the hostile and threatening Arab world, and thus appraisal of Arab
collective threat constitutes a major barrier to reconciliation with Jordan.
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Conclusion
Our study empirically examined the psychological correlates of Jewish-Israeli
attitudes toward peaceful reconciliation in the post-conflict Israeli-Jordanian relations.
Public support for formal reconciliation policies with Jordan was found to be significantly
predicted by our psychological measures of animosity towards Jordanians and negatively
correlated with appraisal of outgroup collective threat, hatred and (low) sympathy towards
Jordanians.
Generally, our findings indicate that appraisal of outgroup collective threat
constitutes a major barrier to conflict resolution and peaceful reconciliation. This is
consistent with findings of previous studies (Bar-On, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2001). However, the
fact that appraisal of collective Arab threat (and not the appraisal of Jordanian collective
threat) was found in our study to be a major barrier to reconciliation with Jordan clearly
shows that the asymmetric post-conflict dynamics between Israel and Jordan cannot be
detached from the wider context of the Israeli-Arab conflict (in which this asymmetry
disappears or is even reversed). The more general appraisal of Arab collective threat to
Israel still powerfully hinders Israeli readiness for peaceful reconciliation even in cases,
such as with Jordan, where formal peace agreements have been reached.
Another interesting finding of this study concerns the role of sympathy in IsraeliJordanian post-conflict relations. As perhaps could be expected, Israeli-Jews still feel some
(but very low) hatred towards Jordanians and this constitutes a significant barrier to their
support for reconciliation with this country. However, less expected in this context of
formal peace is the low sympathy Israeli-Jews feel towards Jordanians The importance of
this result is even further emphasized when we consider that this feeling of low sympathy
towards Jordanians is a barrier to Jewish-Israeli reconciliation support (β= .15) that is as
strong as the feeling of hatred towards Jordanians (β= -.15). While sympathy towards
others is usually seen as a “soft” variable, i.e. linked to dialogues and interpersonal
emotions, our findings indicate that this variable also has an important role at the policy
level as it significantly and independently predicts support for reconciliation.
The moral exclusion model, developed by the social psychologist Susan Opotow,
describes a process in which people are placed “outside the boundary in which moral
values, rules and considerations of fairness apply” (1990, p. 1). Causing or allowing harm
to those outside of one’s moral community is justified and rationalized on the premise that
they are expendable, undeserving, exploitable, and irrelevant (Opotow, 1990). Especially in
asymmetric conflict, moral exclusion may lead to the use of aggression towards the weaker,
morally excluded group (Staub, 1990). In the context of the asymmetric, post-conflict
relations between Israel and Jordan, the Jewish-Israeli lack of sympathy towards Jordanians
may reflect a deeper, underlying process of moral exclusion that constitutes a barrier to the
willingness to reconcile with Jordan and may even facilitate, in certain cases, intergroup
aggression.
Given the important moral and political implications of intergroup sympathy, it
would be interesting to examine in further research the factors that influence the level of
sympathy towards the other side in conflict and post-conflict situations.
In the specific context of Israeli-Jordanian relations, it seems that the cold peace
between the two countries has turned into “frozen peace” that may also freeze advances
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towards more meaningful measures of political reconciliation between the two countries.
Thus, practical ways to cope with this very low sympathy and “warm up” the peace should
be considered. One prevalent device for improving relations and increasing sympathy
between groups is structured contacts and encounters (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998).
Contact interventions have been shown as effective in creating more positive mutual
relations also in the specific context of Jewish-Arab relations (Salomon, 2006). In line with
this, since the signing of the Oslo peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians,
several dozen interventions of organized contacts between members of these two groups are
conducted each year, and are still being conducted now even after the breakup of the peace
process and through different phases of increased violence between the sides. These include
encounters, dialogues and cooperative projects between school and university students,
teachers, university professors, religious leaders, medical doctors, journalists etc. (Maoz,
2004). Moreover, problem-solving workshops between Israelis and Palestinians have been
conducted since the 1970s by Herbert Kelman and his colleagues and have shown to
increase understanding and readiness for reconciliation in both sides (Kelman, 1999).
However, the signing of peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was not followed by
such initiatives. As a result, there exist very few to nearly no organized contacts between
Israelis and Jordanians (one rare exception is the “Crossing Borders” project that includes
Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian youth). Consistently with this, our survey data indicates
that only a small percentage (23%) of Israeli-Jews has ever met a Jordanian, while the
majority of respondents (77%) reported that they have never met one). This variable of
“meeting a Jordanian” was also found to be significantly and positively correlated with the
extent of sympathy towards Jordanians (r= .23, p< .001). Thus, it may be that the strategy
of grassroots contacts and encounters, that is widely used in the context of the conflictual
relations between Israeli-Jews and Palestinians should be also more extensively employed
in the case of post-conflict relations between Israel and Jordan. Since contacts do have a
role in creating sympathy (Bar-On, 2008), they may be even more required in such phases
of “freezing peace” in order to enable further transition into political reconciliation. Given
the fact that Israel has a much greater level of military and economic power, higher Israeli
sympathy towards Jordanians can be a crucial factor in increasing support for further
reconciliation between the two countries.
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Table 1. Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations and Percentage of Support for
Reconciliation Policy Items

1

1. Open Borders

2

3

4

5

6

1

2. Joint Economic
Institutions

.53

1

3. Joint Political
Institutions

.43

.54

1

4. Curriculum
Change

.45

.42

.46

1

5. Legal Measures
against Incitement

.27

.32

.23

.32

1

6. Support for
Political
Reconciliation
Scale

.76

.77

.74

.74

.59

1

Mean

SD

Support
Percentage

2.65

.98

61.0%

2.98

.88

77.4%

2.54

.96

54.4%

2.33

.99

44.0%

2.68

.92

60.0%

2.64

.68

58.2%

Note. N = 823- 935 for all statistics. All correlations are significant ( p < .01 two-tailed) .
Support percentage is percentage of those rated 3 or 4 (“Support” or “Strongly support”) on
a bi-directional 1 to 4 scale ranging from “Strongly object” to “Strongly support”.
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Table 2. Means (Standard Deviations) of Scales of Animosity towards Jordanians

Mean
1

2

3

4

5
(SD)
3.59

1. Appraisal of Arab
Collective Threat (4)

.63

(.82)
2.65

2. Appraisal of Jordanian
Collective Threat (2)

.23***

.33

3. Hatred (2)

.27***

.24***

.78

4. Sympathy (2)

-.25***

-.22***

-.08**

.68

5. Support for Political
Reconciliation (5)

-.43***

-27***

-.31***

.31***

(.81)
1.67
(.98)
2.39
(1.03)
2.64
.78

Note. N = 979-1000. Number of scale items appears in parenthesis near scale title. .
Correlations in italics on diagonal are Cronbach Alphas of the corresponding scales.
*p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
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